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The Case for Full Taxation
Capital Gains
NEIL BROOKS and ARTHUR PELTOMAA
The business community has mounted a concerted lob-
by to have capital gains exempted from tax. In both
speeches and financial publications, business leaders and
many financial journalists are calling for the end of the tax
on capital gains. This movement coincides with similar de-
velopments in the United States which have culminated in
a reduction of taxes on capital gains in the recently passed
Revenue Act of 1978. Canadian business interests often
appear to borrow their ideas for reform from measures that
special interest groups in the United States succeed in get-
ting passed through Congress. Therefore, it is worth noting
that of the over $2 billion of capital gains relief this re-
cently enacted American provision will provide, 75 per cent
will be received by the wealthiest 2 per cent of taxpayers.
The movement in Canada has also derived considerable
impetus from the recent report of the Royal Commission
on Corporate Concentration which recommended the abo-
lition of the tax. The Commission's recommendation co-
incided well with the lobbyists' activities. It also went be-
yond the Commission's terms of reference and was unsup-
ported by any background study. It was explained by
George Radwanski of the Financial Times in these terms:
"once you're putting in a good word for your friends, why
not go all the way?"
The lobby effort has now reached the stage where
stockbrokers and investment dealers are circulating thou-
sands of petitions to customers and other sympathetic
signatories calling for the abolition of the tax. The petition
circulated by Yorkton Securities of Toronto describes the
tax as a "significant deterrent to investment," and adds
that "abolition would probably lead to a higher level of
personal investment and risk capital formation."
The suggestion that the capital gains tax should be abo-
lished and the arguments supporting such a suggestion are
so tenous that it is hard to take them seriously. But they
must be taken seriously. The tax reform process in Canada
clearly reveals that even the most ludicrous of ideas, if sup-
ported by business interests, are often acted upon by the
government.
Neil Brooks is an associate professor at Osgoode Hall Law
School, York University.
Arthur Peltomaa is a teaching fellow at Osgoode Hall Law
School, York University.
A capital gain is the profit an investor receives from the
sale of property, usually corporate shares or real estate. The
present tax law gives such income privileged treatment in
two ways. First, only one-half of the profit has to be in-
cluded in the investor's income for tax purposes. Second,
the tax is only payable on such income when the property
is disposed of, rather than when the gain accrues. Under an
equitable tax system, an investor who held property that
appreciated in a year would be taxed on that appreciated
value whether or not it was realized in cash. A $100 ap-
preciation in the value of stock increases a person's com-
mand over goods and services to the same extent as $100
in earned income.
Instead of exempting gains from investment property
from tax, the sensible thing for the government to do
would be to stop giving such income the enormously ge-
nerous preferential treatment it receives under the present
law and to tax it in the same fashion as income from la-
bour.
The Case for Taxing Capital Gains
The case for taxing capital gains at the normal rates is
straightforward and compelling. The following are some of
the obvious reasons:
A dollar of profit resulting from the sale of a capital
asset increases a person's capacity to consume or ability to
pay by as much as a dollar earned through personal effort.
Therefore, a tax system premised upon ability to pay and
upon the most fundamental axiom of justice - that people
similarly situated should be treated equally - should tax
capital gains in full.
To the extent that income from capital is not taxed, it
means that other income, income from labour for example,
must be taxed at higher rates. Thus, not taxing capital gains
at full rates causes a redistribution of the tax burden from
investors to wage and salary earners.
The benefits of taxing capital gains at preferential rates
accrue almost exclusively to a small minority of high-in-
come individuals. In 1975, over 30 per cent of the capital
gains were reported by people with income over $50,000,
people who represented only .6 per cent of all tax return
filers. The average person in the $5,000 - $10,000 income





ferential tax rate. But the average person with income over
$100,000 received a benefit of $4,222 - over a thousand
times greater!
The argument for repeal of the tax on capital gains
was buttressed by the Royal Commission on Corporate
Concentration when it noted that repealing the tax would
simplify the Income Tax Act. However, an appeal to tax
simplification more compellingly supports the abolition of
the distinction between ordinary and capital gains. Such a
move would render the majority of the most complicated
provisions in the Act unnecessary.
The tax reform process in Canada clearly reveals that
even the most ludicrous of ideas, if supported by
business interests, are often acted upon by
the government.
A capital gain has no economic reality; it is merely a
legal construct. Therefore, high income taxpayers are some-
times able, with the assistance of expert advice, to recast
transactions so that, without changing their economic
reality, they attract preferential capital gains treatment.
This "tax game" results in an enormous waste of resources
in legal planning and litigation and in the compliance and
administrative costs the Government must expend to police
the game. It also has a debilitating effect on the tax moral-
ity of those taxpayers unable to escape tax by "playing the
game." Thus, the integrity of the self-assessment system is
threatened.
Capital losses, except to a limited extent, can only be
deducted from capital gains. This is unfair to many tax-
payers who have large capital losses but no capital gains
against which to offset them. But because capital gains are
taxed only when realized, this limitation on the deduction
of losses is necessary to prevent taxpayers from timing their
capital losses to their best advantage. If it were not for this
rule, taxpayers could avoid tax by realizing losses as they
accrue in high-income years while allowing large capital
gains to accrue tax-free and realizing them in low-income
years. However, if capital gains were fully taxed on accrual,
the unfairness of not permitting taxpayers to deduct their
capital losses from ordinary income could be eliminated.
Not taxing capital gains at full rates leads to economic
ineffiencies. First, to the extent that capital gains are ac-
corded preferential treatment the price relationship bet-
ween assets of equal economic value is upset: capital is di-
verted from its optimum use into investments that promise
a return in the form of capital appreciation. As a result,
there is an over-investment in such activities as real estate
speculation. Second, the present system results in a tax
advantage in favor of corporate accumulations. Because
shareholders are anxious to realize the return on their in-
vestment in the form of equity appreciation, corporations
are under no pressure to pay out dividends. Consequently,
corporations become less dependent on new stock issues to
finance growth. The securities marketplace is thus not
able to perform its allocative function and corporate mana-
gers have one less reason to maximize profits.
Removing the tax on capital gains would provide an
enormous and unjustifiable windfall to all those investors
who already have money invested in capital assets. And
once the tax advantage was reflected in the price of the
assets to which it attaches, new investors would receive
very little advantage by investing in capital assets. Since
the purpose of the incentive is to encourage people to in-
vest, it should only apply to new investments; it should
not be given to those who are willing to invest in the ab-
sence of the subsidy. In no other subsidy program would
the government tolerate such a windfall.
Not only is the concept of capital gains inequitable and
inefficient, but also it is replete with inconsistencies and
cannot be administered with a reasonable degree of cer-
tainty. The borderline between a capital and an income gain
is the most litigated issue in tax law.
Finally, the ultimate irony of a commission on corpor-
ate concentration recommending the abolition of the tax
on capital gains is that such a change would result in in-
creased corporate concentration. The only way that an en-
trepreneur can receive this subsidy is by selling a success-
ful enterprise and realizing a capital gain. Naturally, it will
be large corporations that provide the market for the sale of
small on-going businesses.
In the face of these reasons for taxing capital gains at
full rates, the arguments for providing them preferential
treatment, much less their total exemption from tax, pale
in significance. Indeed, their feebleness would be laugh-
able were it not for the political strength of the lobbyists
advancing them. The proponents of the abolition of the tax
on capital gains make appeals to fairness, economic effi-
ciency and the need for the government to foster sustained
economic growth. Each of these appeals will be examined
in turn.
Fairness
It is sometimes argued that a preferential rate for cap-
ital gains is necessary in order to make the taxation of this
type of income equivalent to the taxation of income from
labour. The preferential rate is said to compensate for the
problems of bunching and inflation, both of which cause
capital gains to be taxed unfairly.
(a) Bunching - Preferential treatment of capital gains is
said to serve as a remedy for the inequity of taxing in one
year, at progressive rates, a gain that has accrued over a
number of years. If the gain were taxed annually as it
accrued, it would be taxed at the taxpayer's normal
marginal rates. However, because it is all added to the tax-
payer's income in the year that it is realized, the taxpayer's
income will be abnormally high in that year and the gain
will be taxed at unfairly high marginal rates. This argument
for preferential treatment is without validity.
First, the Income Tax Act provides a means by which
large capital gains realized in one year can, in effect, be re-
ceived and taxed in equal amounts over a fifteen-year
period. As well as this liberal averaging provision, the Act
provides that if the proceeds of sale are received on an in-
stallment basis, the gain is not taxed until the cash is re-
ceived.
A second flaw in the argument that the "bunching"
effect justifies preferential capital gains treatment is that
for most people who realize capital gains, bunching is not a
problem. Over 40 per cent of the capital gains are received
by taxpayers with income of over $50,000. These taxpayers
are likely to be in or close to the highest income tax brack-
et every year; thus bunching will not push them into higher
marginal tax brackets. Moreover, to the extent that capi-
tal gains are small they are not likely to move taxpayers
into higher tax brackets. And to the extent that a taxpayer
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realizes capital gains on a fairly regular basis - and the evi-
dence suggests that to most taxpayers realizing capital gains
they are a regular source of income - no income distortion
occurs even if gains are bunched on individual assets.
Finally, bunching would be entirely avoided in the
most equitable system, namely, one in which capital gains
are taxed as they accrue. Indeed, the argument for prefer-
ential treatment overlooks the value of tax deferral. To the
extent that capital gains are not taxed as they accrue each
year, the taxpayer has received an interest-free loan from
the government equal to the amount of tax that would be
owed if the gain were taxed as it accrued. The value of this
loan will in practically all cases vastly exceed the additional
tax payable because of the bunching of the gain.
(b) Inflation The current preferential treatment of
capital gains is sometimes justified as a correction for the
effects of inflation. To the extent that an increase in the
price of property simply reflects a general rise in prices
there is no increase in the owner's economic power. Ideally,
since only increases in economic power are the proper sub-
ject of taxation, all inflationary gains ought to be ignored
for tax purposes. However, this argument for the present
preferential treatment of capital gains, and even more so
for their total exemption from tax, also fails on a number
of counts.
The exclusion of one-half of all capital gains is an ex-
tremely crude instrument with which to compensate for
inflation; rarely will it accurately isolate and eliminate the
inflationary element of capital gains. The historical evi-
dence reveals that for practically all holding periods the
exemption from tax of one-half of capital gains would have
resulted in the investor being vastly over-compensated for
inflation. This would be all the more true if capital gains
were totally exempted from tax.
This method of compensating for inflation unfairly
favours those who realize quick gains. For example, if an
asset doubles in value in two years, excluding half the gain
from tax to compensate for declining purchasing power is,
even under the most severe inflation, overly generous. It
also unfairly favours those in the highest marginal tax
brackets. Inflation reduces the purchasing power of all
The benefits of taxing capital gains at preferential rates
accrue almost exclusively to a small minority of high-
income individuals.
capital gains recipients. And yet the present system saves a
person in a 50 per cent bracket a great deal more money
than a person in a 25 per cent bracket who realizes the
same amount of capital gains.
Furthermore, in an inflationary economy, debt, as well
as all types of income from capital must be adjusted for
inflation. Adjusting only capital gains creates additional in-
equities. For example, it seems unfair to compensate hold-
ers of stock for inflation but not savings account deposi-
tors, particularly because the latter are not as heavily con-
centrated in upper-income brackets as holders of capital
property. Also in an inflationary period debtors enjoy a
gain in real terms. Adjusting only capital gains for inflation
leads to the incongruous result that holders of debt-
financed capital properties have their gains reduced in re-
cognition of inflation, while the fact that they were able
to repay the debt with cheaper dollars is ignored.
Finally, if gains are taxed only when realized no spe-
cial treatment is justified for inflation because, again as a
matter of historical record, the value of tax deferral will,
in most cases, at least equal the tax imposed on the infla-
tionary gain. Perhaps the fairest and most administratively
feasible system would be one in which, when an asset is
sold, the value of deferral and the inflation factor are
reckoned in computing the taxable gain. However, in the
absence of such a system the fairest results will be achieved
by taxing the full amount of the gain on the assumption
these two factors balance one another out.
Economic Efficiency
As well as appeals to fairness, proponents of preferen-
tial treatment for capital gains argue that taxing capital
gains leads to economic inefficiency in that such a tax im-
pairs the mobility of capital. In a tax-free world investors
will continually seek to place their capital in those invest-
ments which, in their view, will yield the highest rate of re-
turn. Thus, resources will be allocated with maximum mar-
ket efficiency. A tax on capital gains, however, imposes a
cost on the sale of an asset that has appreciated in value.
When such an asset is sold, the investor, after paying the
tax, will have less to invest in another enterprise. This
makes it necessary for taxpayers to earn a substantially
higher return on a new investment in order to maintain
their previous income position. Consequently, investors
tend to hold appreciated investments instead of reallocating
their capital to uses which generate the highest rate of re-
turn. This inefficiency in the market reduces the cost of
capital to established firms, and hurts new ventures which
find it more difficult to dislodge funds from established
enterprises which may be declining or stagnating.
But the extent to which a tax on capital gains locks in
appreciated capital and the economic effect of any such
capital immobility are greatly exaggerated. Innumerable
variables affect a person's decision to buy or sell stock, and
it seems unlikely that an investor will hold an investment of
dubious return, if a more attractive one is available, simply
because of the tax cost of selling. Only if the difference in
the expected rate of return were trivial, would a rational in-
vestor retain his or her present investment. A study done
for the Carter Report found that in the early sixties there
was less investment mobility in Canada than in the United
States even though Canada at that time did not tax capital
gains and the United States did. Thus, there was no evi-
dence to suggest that a lack of capital gain taxation in
Canada improved security mobility.
Some recent studies in the United States tend to show
(although their findings have been disputed) that high-in-
come individuals are less likely to sell capital assets because
of the tax on sale. However, these studies have no bearing
on the situation in Canada. Canada's averaging provisions
for capital gains are far more liberal and, more impor-
tantly, in the United States the factor that aggravates the
locked-in problem does not pertain to the Canadian situa-
tion. In the United States, if an investor holds on to a
capital asset until death the tax on its appreciated value can
to some extent be avoided. However in Canada, of course,
an investor would have no such incentive for retaining a
capital asset that had appreciated in value; there is a
deemed disposition of all capital property on death and tax
is imposed on its appreciated value.
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But even assuming that some investors are reluctant to
unlock their investments because of the tax on capital
gains, it is still not clear that this has any serious effects on
economic efficiency. Two arguments are frequently made:
that the locked-in effect restricts the flow of capital to new
enterprises and that it causes instability in the securities
market. It is difficult to see how capital formation can
suffer much because some investors have capital locked into
particular investments. While one investor's funds might be
tied up, the person who otherwise might have purchased
those investments now has funds available to use elsewhere.
And while individuals have varying investment aspirations
... exempting capital gains from tax is the most
inequitable way of encouraging savings.
and abilities, generally it is likely that potential buyers of a
locked-in investment would use their available funds for
much the same uses as would the locked-in investors.
The locked-in effect is also said to aggravate fluctua-
tions in the stock market. The contention is that a rising
market locks in gains, and the investors' reluctance to sell
and incur the tax reduces the available supply of securities.
This artificially reduced supply of securities will result in
price increases. A number of points might be made about
this argument. First, there is no compelling relationship
between the stock market and instability in the economy.
Second, in the absence of a capital gains tax more money
would be coaxed into the market. It is conceivable that
this increased demand would exceed the increased supply
that would result from the elimination of lock-in. If so,
prices would rise even more. Third, the fluctuations attri-
butable to the locked-in effect are minimal because, in
most cases, the same investors are on both sides of the mar-
ket. That is to say, if people selling certain stocks are sim-
ply re-purchasing others, aggregate demand remains the
same whether or not the tax is imposed. If a person is both
a buyer and seller his net influence on the market will be
nil. The argument that the locked-in effect aggravates mar-
ket instability assumes that people who might unlock their
investments would withdraw their funds from the mar-
ket altogether. For most investors this seems unlikely.
Two final points about the locked-in effect should be
noted. First, when we consider the effect of capital gains
taxation on the mobility of capital, we must also consider
the effect of the full deductibility of capital losses. During a
period of economic decline, full deduction of losses would
tend to make capital more mobile since there would be a
tax incentive to realize losses. This would facilitate the
transfer of assets into more efficient uses. Second, the
locked-in problem arises only because capital gains are pre-
sently given preferential treatment in that they are only
taxed when realized. If they were taxed in the most equit-
able fashion - on an accrual basis - there would be no
locked-in problem. Tax considerations would have absol-
utely no effect on an investor's decision to buy or sell, and
capital would freely seek its most efficient economic use.
Subsidy for Sustained Economic Growth
The Royal Commission on Corporate Concentration
argued that the capital gains tax should be abolished in
order to increase aggregate savings in the economy and the
availability of financial capital, particularly equity capital
and capital to finance risk ventures. Thus, although it was
not explicitly stated in this fashion in its report, the bene.
fit of not taxing capital gains was viewed by the Commis-
sion as equivalent to a subsidy that the government gives
to sellers of capital property in pursuit of the goal of eco-
nomic growth. Viewed as a subsidy for this purpose, the
non-taxation of capital gains has a number of defects.
(a) Encourage Savings - Over the last few years various
economists and business interests have been warning of an
impending capital gap. They argue that unless drastic steps
are taken the amount of aggregate savings in the economy
will not be sufficient to finance the necessary capital in-
vestment. The abolition of the capital gains tax was pre-
sumably perceived by the Commission as one way of en-
couraging savings in order to provide for future capital
needs.
The capital scarcity theory has become the rallying cry
for all high-income taxpayers seeking a tax break. This is so
in spite of the facts that the evidence of any impending
shortage of financial capital is meagre; a capital shortage in
Canada will only be serious if it reflects an international ca-
pital gap; aggregate studies of capital needs are inappro-
priate in a complex economy; it is not clear that the growth
of capital stock has a significant impact on economic
growth; and, at present, physical capital is underutilized
(thus it is possible to increase the level of investment sim-
ply by increasing the willingness of businesses or indivi-
duals to expand the use of plant, equipment, and other
types of capital). However, even accepting the capital
scarcity theory, exempting capital gains from tax is an in-
efficient and inequitable way of meeting it.
A number of arguments are often made in support of
To the extent that capital gains are not taxed as they
accrue each year, the taxpayer has received an interest-
free loan from the government ...
the notion that abolishing the tax on capital gains will in-
crease savings. The premise of each of these arguments is
open to question. First, it is said that since capital gains are
often irregular increments to income, people are more
likely to save than consume the amount of the gain. Taxing
part of the gain will, therefore, directly reduce aggregate
savings. However, the more plausible assumption is that to
most people capital gains are a recurring form of income. In
terms of whether they save or consume a capital gain, most
people probably do not distinguish it from other forms of
income. Indeed, we know very little about the relationship
between income and consumption, except that the propen-
sity to consume appears to decrease as income rises. If an
additional income tax were allocated among income classes
in the same way capital gains are now distributed, it is un-
clear that the effect on savings and consumption would be
any different.
Second, it is argued that taxing capital gains reduces
the after-tax rate of return to savers. This, in turn, causes
some substitution away from saving and in favour of con-
sumption. However, a multitude of factors affect the
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amount that an individual saves and it has been shown that
personal savings are not very sensitive to the rate of return;
indeed the consensus among economists is that aggregate
personal saving is unresponsive to changes in the after-tax
rate of return.
... as a subsidy for risk-taking the non-taxation of
capital gains is ridiculously target-inefficient.
Third, some say that savings will be increased if capital
gains are not taxed because the non-taxation of capital
gains provides a tax incentive for corporations to retain
their earnings and thereby increase the value of their shares,
rather than pay out profits to shareholders in the form of
dividends. But, while the non-taxation of capital gains
might lead corporations to increase savings, to the extent
that increased share values increase the wealth of indiv-
iduals, there is likely to be a corresponding decrease in
personal savings.
Fourth, it is argued that since a tax on capital gains
falls most heavily upon high-income taxpayers, it reduces
the disposable income of those people with the highest pro-
pensity to save. While this argument is undoubtedly true, it
points up the fact that exempting capital gains from tax is
the most inequitable way of encouraging savings. Capital
gains is a form of income available to only a small number
of, in the main, high-income taxpayers. Surely if a tax in-
centive for savings is required, it should be available to all
taxpayers, wage earners as well as property owners. And,
if the government is intent on increasing savings by reduc-
ing the tax burden on high-income taxpayers, the most
economically efficient way of doing it is by simply reducing
their tax rates. Indeed, the fact that this is a politically un-
attractive alternative probably explains the appeals to idea-
logy surrounding the capital gains tax: high-income tax-
payers can camouflage their real goal - lower taxes on them-
selves -with the ideologies of economic growth.
Two further points might be made about this general
argument. First, full taxation of capital gains will undoubt-
edly result in increased savings for some people. Full taxa-
tion will cause a decline in the price of capital property.
People will resond to this decline in their wealth by in-
creasing their savings in an effort to rebuild it. Second, like
all subsidies provided through the Income Tax Act, this
subsidy to encourage savings has an upside-down effect. If a
taxpayer in the sixty per cent tax bracket sells an asset and
capital gains are not taxed, the government subsidizes this
person to the tune of sixty cents per dollar. A taxpayer in
the thirty per cent tax bracket receives a subsidy for an
equivalent gain only to the extent of thirty cents per dol-
lar. It is intolerable that a low-income taxpayer who en-
gages in the identical economic activity as a high-income
taxpayer, and who supposedly contributes as much to the
economy, receives only one-half as great a subsidy.
(b) Encourage Equity Investment - There has been in-
creasing concern in Canada about the thinness of the equity
securities market. Indeed the Commission on Corporate
Concentration expressed grave concern about the lack of
equity capital in Canada. It noted that in the last few years
the number of new equity issues, particularly those of
medium-sized and small firms, has been steadily declining.
Corporate stock is, of course, one ot the principal types of
assets to which capital gains accrue. Exemption of capital
gains is thus seen as a method of increasing the after-tax
rate of return on corporate stock, and of encouraging in-
vestors to purchase it. This will increase the price of stock
and reduce the cost of new equity issues. However, there
are a number of problems with this assessment.
First, it is doubtful whether a tax subsidy to individual
Canadian investors can in any serious way affect the price
of Canadian securities. A large majority of securities are
held by institutional investors who are indifferent as to
whether capital gains are taxed at preferential rates. Fur-
thermore, because non-residents of Canada hold invest-
ments in Canadian securities, the price of Canadian secur-
ities must move in the same general direction as foreign se-
curities. An increased demand by Canadian investors for
Canadian securities will drive up their price, but this in-
creased demand will be offset to some extent by the con-
sequent selling by non-residents.
Second, it is uncertain what effect an increase in the
price of corporate stock will have on business investment
expenditures. If there is a lack of profitable investment op-
portunities, reducing the price of equity financing will
have no impact on economic growth. Indeed, most econo-
mists have asserted that Canadian businessmen are failing
to invest in productive resources not because of a lack of
equity financing but because the rate of return on new in-
vestments does not justify the undertaking.
At any rate, as we mentioned earlier, exempting capi-
tal gains makes companies less dependent on the new is-
sue market.
(c) Encourage Risk Capital - Another matter that con-
cerned the Commission was the "deficiency in the availa-
bility of risk capital in Canada." The abolition of the tax on
capital gains was presumably seen as a means of encourag-
ing investors to increase risk-taking. Abolishing the tax on
capital gains should increase risk-taking by permitting the
owners of successful ventures to sell their enterprise and
realize a gain that would not be taxed; thus increasing the
potential after-tax rate of return on such enterprises. Also,
to the extent that exempting capital gains from tax re-
duces the cost of equity capital, it should permit firms to
finance by equity capital and thus engage in more risky
undertakings.
High-income taxpayers can camouflage their real goal-
lower taxes on themselves-with the idealogies of
economic growth.
This argument is subject to the reservations that the
encouragement of risk investment is not necessarily a good
thing; the non-taxation of capital gains is likely only a
trivial incentive to risk-taking; and as a subsidy for risk-
taking the non-taxation of capital gains is ridiculously
target-inefficient.
The reason that the non-taxation of capital gains is
not likely to have an important impact on risk-taking is
that if capital gains are not taxed, capital losses cannot be
used to reduce tax liability. The full taxation of capital
gains would permit the full deductibility of losses. There-
fore, when the chances of gain or loss are regarded as equal,
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a tax on capital gains does not affect the preference for
risk-taking. Indeed, since losses are more frequently the
result of risky investment, the full taxation of gains coupled
with the full offset of capital losses would reduce the
downside risk and might actually increase risk-taking.
A subsidy for risk-taking provided by means of the
exemption of capital gains from tax is target-inefficient.
Indeed, it is both over- and under-inclusive. On the one
hand, it benefits all sorts of investments which do not in-
volve the taking of risks, for example, blue chip securities
and real estate. In fact, the majority of capital gains are
realized on these types of investments. On the other hand,
many entrepreneurs who undertake risky investments are
unable to turn their profits into capital gains in order to
take advantage of the subsidy.
Conclusion
The economic gains, if any, of not taxing capital gains
are utterly trivial when compared to the economic dis-
tortions, administrative costs and inequity of not taxing
them at full rates. Unfortunately, the political constituency
that might support full taxation is diffuse. No group in
particular is hurt by the exemption of capital gains from
tax. Consequently, the assertions that capital gains should
not be taxed go largely unopposed, and eventually acquire
an undeserved legitimacy.
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